This paper measures social capital of trustworthiness using an experimental protocol designed to distinguish this norm from altruism. Experimental participants were drawn from South African households surveyed by a longitudinal living standards survey. This procedure not only permits analysis of the impact of experimentally measured norms on real world outcomes, it also provides a rich array of data that can be used to control for initial conditions and prior possibilities that might be spuriously correlated with norms. Interestingly, altruism has more robust e¤ects on livelihoods than does trustworthiness. This …nding motivates a deeper reconsideration on how trusts works, especially in societies like South Africa's where the boundaries of trust are likely to be tightly circumscribed by histories of social isolation and segregation.
Introduction
In the Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith stressed that social norms, which control the "self-regarding passions"and lead individuals to behave in a trustworthy manner, are a vital underpinning of human society. Similarly, the more recent literature on social capital claims that norms that compel trustworthiness are essential to the operation of market economies.
1 Trustworthiness makes cooperation possible while avoiding the cost associated with the enforcement of legal contracts (Putnam, 1995; Fukuyama, 1999) . In less developed economies where the cost of legality is high, and where …nancial markets are thin or missing, relations based on trust or informal enforcement mechanisms may provide the only avenues of access to credit and insurance. Consistent with this hypothesis, Narayan and Pritchett (1998) in an early quantitative study …nd that a greater density of civic associations (which they interpret as an indicator of the social capital of trust) enhances the capacity of individual households to generate a livelihood in poor countries. Similar results are found for South Africa in the work by Maluccio et al. (2000) and Haddad and Maluccio (2003) .
While provocative, this body of work faces the challenge that social norms are intrinsically di¢ cult to measure. This paper employs experimental economic methods to directly measure trustworthiness, understood as a "moral"or "action limiting" norm (see Platteau, 2000 and Basu, 2000, respectively) . While the well-known trust game would seem to be an ideal instrument for measuring trust and trustworthiness, play in the trust game may also re ‡ect the operation of a purely altruistic norm (a norm which may have quite distinctive implications for social capital and economic advancement). To address this issue, the analysis here employs an experimental protocol in which individuals reveal their degree of altruism which can then be used to construct a net-trustworthiness measure shorn of the potentially confounding in ‡uence of altruism.
A second key feature of this study is that individuals selected to participate in the experimental study belonged to a random sample of South African communities that are part of the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics (or KIDS) longitudinal living standards study. This design permits us to match artefactual experimental measures with actual household economic data so that we can explore the economic impacts of social capital at the concrete level of local social groups, as Sobel (2002) suggests. In addition, the three-rounds of the KIDS panel dataset o¤er analytical degrees of freedom that can be used to address econometric identi…cation issues. 2 In its e¤ort to use measures derived from experimental games to explore real economic outcomes, this study builds on the pioneering work of Hans Binswanger who used experimentally derived risk preferences to explore individual farming decisions (see the summary in Binswanger and Sillers 1983) . Similar to this work, Karlan (2005) uses economic experiments to measure norms and then explores the impact of these norms (understood as social capital) on the loan repayment decisions of low wealth, microcredit clients. Unlike Karlan's work, the analysis here does not analyze behavior in a particular transaction, but returns to the broader social capital literature and asks whether individuals living in communities characterized by greater degrees of trust are better able to advance economically.
As with the Karlan and the Binswanger and Sillers work, the analysis here is potentially subject to the Levitt and List (2006) critique that economic experiments may provide an untrustworthy guide to individuals' behavior in real transactions. Ultimately, of course, the proof is in the pudding. The fact that this study (like those of Binswanger and Karlan) …nds statistically reliable connections between experimental play and real world economic outcomes suggests that experiments are able to measure information that is otherwise unavailable to us as researchers, a point that is more thoroughly developed by Castillo and Carter (2007) .
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the intuition behind our strategy to measure social capital using multiple economic experiments and uses a simple model of participant behavior to derive a measure of trustworthiness that is purged of the in ‡uence of altruism. Section 3 describes the experimental protocol and its implementation in South Africa, and shows that while altruism and trust game play are indeed tightly intertwined, the latter reveals the operation of social norms beyond what can be explained based on altruistic considerations alone. Using the experimentally derived norm measures, Section 4 then follows the social capital literature and estimates the impact of 2 Because norms may themselves endogenously evolve with the growth of material living standards (e.g., see Francois and Zabojnik, 2005) , it is especially important to employ an adequate set of econometric controls. From this perspective, directly measured norms o¤er additional advantages over group membership indicators of social capital as group membership is obviously directly economically endogenous as it takes time and money to join and participate in social groups.
these norms on household well-being controlling for community e¤ects and prior levels and rates of improvement in individual well-being. We …nd that social norms matter (boosting economic possibilities), though surprisingly altruism appears to matter more than trustworthiness. Our …nding that social norms matter would seem to allay some of the fears expressed by Durlauf (1998) and others that the apparently positive economic e¤ects of social capital simply re ‡ects spurious correlations and unresolved identi…cation problems. At the same time, the somewhat puzzling con…guration of …ndings regarding altruism and trustworthiness suggests that we still have much to learn about how to measure and estimate the value of social norms and relationships, as discussed in the concluding section of the paper.
Using Experimental Games to Measure Trustworthiness in the Presence of Altruism
Empirical research on the social capital of trust has either relied on associational density measures (e.g., the number and strength of civic associations), or on direct survey questions which ask respondents to self-report trust and trustworthiness. Neither approach is entirely satisfactory. Associational density measures may con ‡ate group-based information conduits with the operation of norms that stabilize otherwise incentive incompatible inter-temporal exchanges (Fafchamps and Minten, 2002) . Associations are also expensive to establish and join, making them directly economically endogenous. On the other hand, self-reported trust measures are susceptible to distortion and are, in general, di¢ cult to interpret (Putnam, 1995) . Experimental economic methods o¤er an alternative way to measure trustworthiness.
3 Experiments provide economic incentives to participants and resemble economic situations where norms might play a role in shaping behavior. Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman and Soutter (2000) have suggested using the trust game as a way to measure trust. However, as this section discusses, play in the trust game may re ‡ect the operation of several distinctive norms of behavior, norms which would be expected to have quite di¤erent economic implications. A challenge is thus to devise procedures that permit the isolation of these di¤erent norms.
Trust Measurement and the Altruism Confound
In the trust game, an individual (the trustor) is given an endowment of money that he may either keep for himself or send to a recipient (the trustee). Any money sent to the trustee is multiplied (generating a positive return on money "invested" in the trustee). The trustee then has the choice to either keep all the multiplied money received for herself, or to return some to the trustor. Amounts sent by the trustor and those returned by the trustee present themselves as candidate measures for trust and trustworthiness, respectively.
However, there are two potential problems with these measures. The …rst is common to any experiment: Does the experiment evoke the same norms of behavior that individuals bring to their day-to-day economic lives. Indeed, work such as that by Montgomery (1989) suggests that people adopt di¤erent roles and employ di¤erent preference orderings, depending on circumstances. As explained in section 3 below, the experiments employed here were framed as neutral "decisions" in order to avoid invoking particular social norms (see Camerer (1995) on early examples of framing e¤ects in experimental economics).
A second problem with directly interpreting trust game results as indicators of trust and trustworthiness is that play in this game may be shaped by other norms. As developed more formally below, amounts invested and returned in trust games will not necessarily isolate trust and trustworthiness. Trustees can return money in the trust game because of altruistic preferences that compel them to share gains, or because of trustworthiness norms that would compel even non-altruistic individuals to return funds when entrusted with others' money. Similarly, trustors might send money away out of a sense of altruism, as well as out of an expectation of return and sel…sh gain. 4 Distinguishing between these two motives is quite important if altruism operates as an e¤ort discouraging tax regime while trustworthiness facilitates e¤ort and investment, as Platteau (2000) argues..
In order to isolate and measure trustworthiness separately from altruism, the experiment employed here had individuals play multiple games, permitting the creation of a trustworthiness measure based on comparison of play across the trust and dictator games. In the latter game, an individual (the 'dictator') is given an endowment of money that she may either share with a passive recipient, or keep for herself (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, and Sefton, 1994) . While the dictator's decision would appear to mimic that of the trustee, a key di¤erence is that the funds available to the dictator were not previously held or allocated to her by her recipient. The dictator game thus opens a window into observing purely altruistic preferences shorn of any obligation to behave in a trustworthy fashion with the receiver's money. Under modest assumptions about the nature of preferences, we will now show that observing an individual play both the dictator and trustee roles allows us to recover a measure of net trustworthiness (i.e., returns beyond what the individual would send were she motivated solely by altruistic considerations). 
Modeling and Measuring Trustworthiness in the Presence of Altruism
The trust game described above is particularly appropriate for the analysis of social capital because its structure matches the incentives of a loan contract in which there is no legal enforcement of repayment obligations. Denote as B T the …nancial endowment given to the trustor in the trust game. The trustor divides this endowment between funds retained for himself and funds sent to an anonymous trustee (S). Funds sent to the trustee are implicitly invested in a project which yields a gross rate of return of > 1 such that the trustee receives S as her gross income. The trustee then chooses an amount R to return to the trustor. The trustee is free to return as much or as little of gross income to the trustor as she wishes, and faces no legal (or other external) sanctions should she return nothing to the trustor. For this reason of course, the amount sent by the trustor, or that returned by the trustee, suggests themselves as measures of the level of trustworthiness in a community. 6 When implemented as a one-shot, anonymous exercise shorn of repetition and reputation e¤ects (as we do here), the trust game should reveal information on what Platteau (2000) calls moral norms and Basu (2000) calls activity limiting 5 This approach of using multiple games to assess motives is not new. Forsythe et al. (1994) employed a dictator game to see if fair o¤ers in the ultimatum game re ‡ected the fear of rejection or an underlying altruistic norm. More recently, Gneezy, Guth and Verboven (2000) used a sequence of trust games to see if trustors would send more money as the games relaxed constraints on trustees'ability to send money back. Closer to our approach, Cox (2000) implemented several dictator games designed to duplicate elements of both trustor and trustee decisions. While the Cox study is based on inter-personal comparisons, he found that sender and receiver decisions are partially explained by unconditional kindness.
6 Barr (2003) , for example, uses information on the distribution of returns anticipated by trustors in the trust game to identify the strength of trustworthiness.
norms. That is, these are norms that are su¢ ciently durable to shape behavior outside of any immediate punishment or incentive structure that might sustain them. In their theoretical analysis of trust and development, Franciois and Zabojnik (2005) argue that it is precisely this durable sort of trust, which does not depend on immediate incentive structures for its maintenance, that is vital to the operation of market economies and economic development.
7 Barrett (1997) makes a smilar point in his discussion about the importance of anonymous trust that permits the sphere of exchange to expand beyond those with whom one has direct social mechanisms of information and control.
While the simplicity of the trust game is compelling, using the gross amount of funds sent by the trustor as a measure of trustworthiness presumes that the trustor would in fact send nothing if he knew for sure that nothing would be repaid by the trustee. While this would be true for a purely sel…sh trustor, we know from a large body of experimental evidence that individuals will unconditionally share money even when the structure of the game prohibits repayment (as in the dictator game described above). Indeed, the trust game makes it relatively cheap for the trustor to altruistically share money with the trustee as each unit of money received by the trustee only costs the trustor 1= units. Similarly, the gross amount of money returned by the trustee in the trust game is likely to be shaped by the same altruistic sharing norms that lead individuals to share money in the dictator game, as well as by any additional norms that compel individuals to return money speci…cally entrusted to them by the trustor. We will refer to this second kind of norm as a norm of trustworthiness.
7 Moral or activity-limiting norms are presumably intially created with some incentives. In the models of Francois and Zabojnik (2005) and Escriche et al. (2004) , parents choose whether or not to socialize their children to a particular set of norms. While even rod-sparing parents create incentive structures for their children to conform to the desired norms, the presumption is that the norms eventually become internalized and persist in limiting behavior well past the point where these incentives are operative. 8 We will refer to behavior such as that seen in the dictator game as altruistic. While altruism denotes the idea that individuals care about others and gain utility from helping them, it is of course possible that players in the dictator game are compelled by a steely sense of duty to share, and do not experience any direct increase in welfare from the act of sharing (Barrett, 1999) . As Barrett discusses, sharing compelled by a constraint of duty may result in free-riding behavior (i.e., I will not share if I expect others to share since the act of sharing makes me worse o¤). However, in the case of our experiments, no such distortion should take place as each individual was interacting with only one individual. This alternative interpretation of seemingly altruistic behavior should thus not distort our e¤ort to isolate the additional compulsion created by trustworthiness norms.
From a social capital perspective, distinguishing between altruistic sharing and trustworthiness is important if the two norms have distinctive economic implications. Platteau (2000) , for example, argues that strong altruistic sharing norms may actively discourage innovation and growth in a community (since norms that compel unconditional sharing of gains act as a tax on income increases), whereas trustworthiness that secures legally unenforceable loan contracts may facilitate economic advance.
To isolate trustworthiness shorn of altruistic in ‡uences, we would like to observe trustee behavior in the absence of trustworthiness considerations. Fortunately, the symmetry between the trustee's decision and that of the dictator in the dictator game suggests a way to create this counterfactual. As noted above, the dictator's decision resembles a counterfactual for the trustee decision in which trustworthiness norms are not operative. A straightforward measure of the strength of trustworthiness norms would then be the di¤erence between the actual trustee share and the counterfactual share as revealed by the same individual's play in the dictator game:
where s d j is the share sent by individual j in the dictator game and S j is the amount received by j as trustee in the trust game. This simple inter-personal comparison measure thus says that the trustee's trustworthiness is signalled by any additional amount that she sends in her role as trustee over and above what she sends as a dictator. 9 While (2.1) is intuitive and compelling in its simplicity, it overlooks one important di¤erence between the trustee and dictator decisions that makes the latter suspect as a clean counterfactual for the former. In the trust game, the trustee knows that the trustor kept the portion of the budget B T S 0 for himself. In the dictator game, no such endowment is given to, or has been retained by, the dictator's partner. Put di¤erently, the proper counterfactual for the trustee's 9 In principal, play by the trustor could also be used to separately identify trust from altruistic preferences. However, in our particular empirical application, we can only separate the two under strong assumptions about the trustor's elasticity of substitution between his own wellbeing and that of the trustee. In addition, as Schechter (forthcoming) shows, trustor behavior is strongly in ‡uenced by risk attitudes, making it even more di¢ cult to identify trust from the trustor behavior absent the sort of separate measurement of risk preferences undertaken by Schechter. decision would be a a dictator game played when the dictator's partner was known to enjoy a prior endowment of B T
S :
However, in the experimental data available for this study we do not observe trustees play a dictator game with appropriately structured pre-play endowments. 10 Unfortunately, ignoring the impact of endowments on trustee play could distort the measure of trustworthiness based on (2.1). Consider, for example, an individual whose altruistic preferences would lead her to a 50-50 division of the spoils in a standard dictator game. If this same individual, as trustee, received only a very modest share from her trustor (indicating that the trustor had already kept more than 50% of the available funds for himself), she would be inclined on purely altruistic grounds to return nothing to the trustor. However, perhaps trustworthiness norms compel her to return a 30% share to the trustor. In this case, trustworthiness measure (2.1) would be -20%, indicating no trustworthiness, when in fact it was exactly a norm of trustworthiness that compelled the trustee to return the 30% share.
By imposing structure on the nature of preferences, we can formalize this intuition and use it to derive a measure of trustworthiness based on a more satisfying counterfactual than that used in (2.1). In particular, assume that in the absence of trustworthiness norms, we can adequately represent a trustee j's preferences by the following CES utility function,
where y s is the total payout received by the individual herself, y o is the total payout received by her partner, j measures the strength of altruistic preferences and j is the elasticity of substitution between payo¤s to herself and to her partner. In the standard dictator game, the dictator must divide a budget of B d between herself and her partner who received no prior endowment, so that
where R d is the amount sent by the dictator to her partner. Choosing R d 0 to maximize utility of the form (2.2) will result in the dictator sending her partner
, where the optimal budget share e j =
However, if the individual knows that her partner received a prior endowment, she will in general send a lower share than e j .
11 In the trust game, the trustee receives a budget of S, and knows that her trustee partner has retained an 10 Note that implementing such a scenario would have required an experiment in which each trustee played an individually tailored dictator game based on the amounts retained by the trustee's trustor partner.
11 However, if trustees care only about the "act of giving," the money endowment kept by endowment of B T S, so that the …nal payouts become y s = S R and y o = (B T S)+R. In this case, if the trustee behaved like an individual in the dictator game and chose R based solely on altruistic considerations in order to maximize (2.2), she would optimally choose:
Note that a purely altruistic individual discounts the amount sent to her partner based on the amount of endowment already enjoyed by the partner. In actual game play, the trustee's choice is censored from below at zero (i.e., the game structure does not permit a trustee to take further funds away from a trustor who retained most of the endowment for himself). Additional insight on this solution can be garnered by examining the solid line in Figure 3 .1. This …gure graphs the censored b R j for di¤erent values of S. 12 As can be seen, a purely altruistic trustee will return nothing to a trustor who kept most of the budget for himself, and indeed would like to take an additional amount away from the trustor were that possible (the uncensored portion when b R j < 0 is shown by the dashed line). Expression (2.3) now opens the door to a more satisfying counterfactual measure of how the individual would have played her role as trustee in the absence of trustworthiness norms. In particular, knowledge of e j and of the amount received by the trustee in the trust game would permit us to use (2.3) to create a measure of how the trustee would behave if her choice was guided solely by altruistic considerations, shorn of any additional compulsion induced by norms of trustworthiness. We can thus modify the naive trustworthiness measure (2.1) as the trustor will not in ‡uence the trustee's decision. Re-specifying our analysis here in terms of impure altruism of this sort (to use the langauge of Andreoni, 1989) would imply uniformly smaller estimates of the degree of trustworthiness (as trustees who ignore trustor endowments should altruistically give no less than they would taking those endowments into consideration). 12 Other parameter values are set at those typical of the actual experiments reported below: = 3; B t = 10, and e j = 0:38, where the latter …gure is based on median play in the dictator game.
13 As can be seen from (2.3), the intercept is strictly negative ( (1 e j )B t ), indicating that purely altruistic trustees will not return anything to trustors who retained most of their budget for themselves. The slope, indicating the amount marginally returned per unit received (e j + (1 e j ) 1 ), is strictly greater than 1 (for > 1), indicating that altruistic trustees ( j > 0) always marginally share some of the gains and repay more than the amount that the trustee sent to the trustor. As the strength of altruism declines, the slope and intercept drop and the non-altruistic trustee (e j t 0) will return nothing. 
Note that this measure of excess trustor returns is simply the di¤erence between actual trustee play and the estimated counterfactual play of the trustee if she operated solely under the in ‡uence of altruistic norms. In terms of Figure 3 .1, b j is proportional to the di¤erence between the observed amount sent by trustor, R j and the predicted amount, b R j ; given by the solid line in the …gure.
14 Note of course that the solid line is individual-speci…c in that its slope and intercept depend on the individual's degree of altruism.
The KwaZulu-Natal Economic Experiment
As described in the introduction, we carried out …eld experiments in fourteen South African communities that were part of an on-going longitudinal living standards study. Seven of the communities were urban, while the other seven were rural. All were located in the South African province of KwaZulu-Natal. KwaZulu-Natal saw some of the most severe politically-motivated violence in South Africa in the time leading up to the 1994 election of Nelson Mandela. Hundreds were killed, and a legacy of mistrust between supporters of the Africa National Congress and the Inkatha Freedom Party continues to shape life in the province. Study communities include tight-knit rural areas operating under chieftaincy structures, as well as politically and ethnically heterogenous urban townships. These communities thus promise substantial variation in levels of both trust and altruism. After describing the experimental procedures employed to identify the key parameters needed for the trustworthiness measures discussed above, this section takes a …rst look at the statistics that describe the experimental results.
14 The di¤erence represented by measure (3.4) can be transformed into a scaled measure of trustworthiness if we impose further structure on the nature of preferences. We can rede…ne y o , the term which gives the trustee altruistic utility, as y o = B t S + R j B t ;where the new parameter j measures the strength of norms that compel trustworthy behavior. If j = 0, then (??) reduces to R S + B t as in the pure altruism case and the trustee would optimally set R = b R j . If j = 1, y o reduces to R S such that this utility function is similar to a Stone-Geary speci…cation in which the trustee only receives altruistic grati…cation after returning more to the trustor than the amount S that originally belonged to the trustor. After some manipulation, we can show that we can measure trustworthiness as j = R j b Rj
(1 e j )B T : Empirical results using this scaled measure are qualitatively similar to those reported below for b j :
Experimental Procedures
The fourteen communities used in this study were originally randomly selected as part of the 1993 South African national living standards survey (PSLSD 1994 details the survey methodology). 15 For the living standards study, approximately 20 households in each community were randomly selected for an in-depth interview. In the KwaZulu-Natal province, these same households were re-interviewed in 1998 and again in 2004 for the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics Study (known as the KIDS study). Forty percent of our experimental subjects were recruited from the respondents to the living standard surveys, while the other sixty percent were selected from other families in the same communities. Not more than one participant per household was allowed. All the participants were at least 18 years old, and they were not told about experimental payments at the time of recruitment. The average age of participants was 43 years old, with 2 out of 5 being male. Twenty …ve percent of the sample was at least 57 years of age and 25% was at most 28 years of age. Participants had on average 6 years of education, with 25% of them having at most 2 years of schooling and 25% of them having at least 10 years of schooling. On average, there were 20 subjects per session. Two sessions were smaller (10 and 15 participants), and three sessions were larger (25 participants). The average participant knew 30% of the people in the room by name. The average payment to a participant in the experiment was 37 Rand (R37, or around $5), which amounts to two-days wage in rural areas.
In keeping with standard practice, the experimental protocol was framed in neutral language.
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All experimental subjects played two games and assumed three roles, dictator, trustor and trustee. Individuals were told that they had several decisions to make with money we would give them and that their decisions would a¤ect their earnings and the earnings of others with whom they would be randomly paired. The intent of this neutral framing is to avoid invoking any particular social role (and norms that might accompany it) that might tilt the analysis in one direction or another.
17 Somewhat at variance with standard procedure, we had each subject play sender and receiver roles in both the dictator 15 The 1993 study selected a total of 70 communities or enumerator districts. For the experimental work, a representative set of 14 communities were purposefully selected from amongst the 70 to insure ethnic diversity and coverage of both urban and rural areas. 16 The experiments were conducted in Zulu except in the Indian community of Chatsworth where the experiments were conducted in English. 17 An appendix available from the authors reports the instructions read to participants and reproduces the various charts used to explain the game. and trust games. This design permits us to form the inter-personal comparison measures for all experimental participants. As we will see in the next section, play in both games is broadly in-line with what has been observed in other …eld experiments, suggesting that this procedure did not lead people to horde all funds for themselves. Ultimately, this outcome may speak to the strength of altruistic and trustworthiness norms that apparently compelled seemingly normal (and locally appropriate) behavior.
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To play the dictator game, subjects were given 2 envelopes, one red and one blue. The red envelope contained R16 in R2 coins, and the blue envelope was empty. To pass some of the R16 to another person in the room, subjects were instructed to put money from the red envelope into the blue envelope. If subjects did not want to share any money, they were told to leave the blue envelope empty. To protect the privacy of subjects'decisions, they were given a 'privacy box,'a cardboard box that prevented other people from seeing their manipulation of envelopes. This 'privacy box'was used in all decisions thereafter. Before any decision was made, a ‡ip chart was used to explain all the choices available to dictators. After everyone had a chance to make a decision, envelopes were collected, 19 shu-ed in front of everyone and assigned to new subjects. The envelopes were not opened until the end of the session. Subjects did not know their payo¤ from previous decisions prior to making the next.
To play the trust game, subjects were given 3 envelopes, one red, one blue and one green. The red envelope contained R10 in R2 coins, and the blue and green envelope were empty and stapled together. To send some of the R10 to some other person in the room, subjects were instructed to pass it from the red envelope to the blue envelope. Subjects were told that any money put in the blue envelope was going to be tripled before being given to another subject. If the receiver wanted to return any of the tripled money in the blue envelope, they were instructed to use the green envelope to do so. 20 If a subject wanted to pass 18 While it might seem reasonable to hypothesize that no one would share funds in the dictator game given that everyone else was also playing the same game, this behavior would not be obvious in a community characterized by strong sharing norms. If individuals considered it likely that others would share, then an altruistic sharing norm would continue to compel them to share lest they receive but not send any money. Our results in fact show sharing levels consistent with expectations in other …eld experiments, giving us con…dence that this con…guration of the dictator game revealed reliable information on sharing norms. 19 Envelopes were collected in trays in order to minimize the contact that experimenters could have with them, and so minimize in ‡uencing subjects'decisions. 20 Envelopes were coded to keep track of the origin and destination of an envelope. The coding no money they were instructed to leave the blue envelope empty. Before any decision was made, a ‡ip chart was used to explain the choices available to trustors. Subjects were asked to …ll out an empty chart expressing how much money they thought would be returned to them had they chosen to send each of the possible options shown there. After this exercise was completed, subjects were asked to make a decision. Envelopes were collected, money in them tripled and shu-ed in front of everyone before being assigned to new subjects. But before the blue and green envelopes were delivered, new ‡ip charts were used to explain the possibilities available to trustees. In addition, an empty chart was given to everyone to be …lled with the amount of money they thought they would have returned had they received any of the amounts listed there. After the charts were completed, subjects were given the blue and green envelopes with the tripled money. They were told to place in the green envelope any money they wanted to return to the sender. Finally, decisions were recorded and the green envelopes returned to the senders. A post-experiment questionnaire was administered immediately after play. Table 3 .1 displays descriptive data from the trust and dictator games played in the 14 South African communities. Mean and median budget shares sent in the dictator game were around 40% for the sample as a whole. These results are consistent with previous works with non-student populations and above the mean sent by student populations (see Camerer and Fehr (2002) for a survey). At the community level the median budget sent in the dictator ranged from 25% to 50%. As discussed above, the altruistic norms that underlie such relatively high levels of giving in the dictator game would be expected to spillover and in ‡uence play in the trust game.
Data on Altruism and Net Trustworthiness
As reported in Table 5 .1, mean (median) budget share sent by trustors in the trust game was 53% (60%). Over 70% of the subjects sent between 40% and 60% of their budget to their trustees. The average amount sent by trustors varied across the 14 communities where the experiments were conducted, with the median budget shares sent ranging from 40% to 60%. 21 The mean (median) was such that nobody knew which code was associated to the envelope sent or received. 21 Prior to playing their role as trustor, individuals played the dictator game. In subsequent research in Honduras, we found that individuals who …rst played the dictator game sent significantly less (6 percentage points) in the trust game, compared to individuals who played the trust game …rst. While we do not have an explanation for this …nding, it sends a cautionary (1 e j )( share returned by trustees, de…ned as , was 38% (33%). Fully 42% of the trustees returned more than a one third budget share, while another 38% of subjects returned exactly one third. From a …nancial perspective, most trustors broke even or better on money sent to trustees. This result is quite remarkable noting that trustees had no (purely sel…sh) incentive to return any money given the anonymity of the experimental design. Amounts returned by trustees are larger than that typically observed in trust experiments with student populations, but in keeping with the general tenor of …eld experiments in developing countries (see the review by Carpenter and Cardenas, 2005) . While most trustees proved trustworthy, it is not clear whether their behavior resulted from the already noted high levels of altruism, or whether it re ‡ected trustworthiness norms. A more precise decomposition of the trustee behavior into altruistic and trustworthiness components is possible using the prediction from the model of trustee behavior developed in section 3. Overall, 71% of subjects returned more as trustees than the pure altruism counterfactual trustee decision predicts.
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The mean (median) value for the net trustworthiness measure (2.4) is 11% (32%). The signi…cance of trustworthiness norms can be more …rmly established by an note that perhaps the order of play made trustors send less money than they otherwise might have. Since this order treatment was uniform across all players, it should not introduce any systematic bias to the analysis. 22 Forty six percent of the trustees returned a budget share that was at least 20 percentage points more than the altruistic model would have predicted. Only 10% of trustees returned a budget share that was at least 20 percentage points less than the altruistic model would have predicted.
econometric test of the implications of a purely altruistic model of trustee behavior. From (2.4), the observed budget share (censored by the non-negativity restriction) will be given by:
If there were no norms of trustworthiness operative, then the Tobit regression of budget share on e j and (1 e j )(
should yield coe¢ cient estimates of 1 and -1 respectively (while the intercept term should be zero). The bottom panel of Table 3 .1 presents these Tobit estimates. As can be seen, the estimated coe¢ cients are quite di¤erent from what would be expected in the case in which purely altruistic considerations determined trustee play in the trust game.
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Figure 3.1 projects the data points from our experiments onto Figure 2 .1 and gives a visual feel for this result. The solid line in that …gure is again the amount that a trustee with a median level of altruism, but no norms of trustworthiness, would have returned as a function of the amount received from the trustor. Such a trustee would have returned nothing to the trustor anytime he received less than about 11 Rand. The purely altruistic model predicts that 23% of trustees would have returned zero given their level of altruism and the endowment retained by their trustors. In fact only 3.5% of trustees returned nothing to their trustors. 
The Economic Value of the Social Capital of Trust
Several prior studies have used micro data to explore the impact of the social capital of trust on the expected material well-being of households. The Narayan and Pritchett (1998) study of Tanzanian households was one of the …rst to explore this hypothesis with data on small, local groupings. In their study, Narayan and Pritchett regress household per-capita expenditures (as a measure of material 23 The coe¢ cients are also statistically di¤erent than those that would be predicted if forgetful trustees ignored game endowments held by trustors (see note 9 above). Forgetfulness implies that regression (3.1) would have an intercept of 1=3, a coe¢ cient on e j of 2=3, and a zero coe¢ cient on the term (1 e j )(
. 24 The trustworthiness norm measure discussed in footnote 14 above, j , has a mean value of 0.19 and a median of 0.52. This value takes on a value of zero when trustworthiness norms are inoperative and a value of one when they compel complete respect for the trustor's rights over money she sent. The data once again exhibit substantial variation across the 14 di¤erent communities as the median value of j within communities ranges from 0.20 to 0.66. well-being) on a set of basic control variables (household size, location and human capital) and on a social capital variable. They measure the latter with an index meant to capture the quantity and quality of associational life (the number of social groups and how well they function). They …nd that a community social capital measure has a strong positive e¤ect on a household's realized level of percapita expenditures.
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Using the …rst two rounds of the living standards data available for this study (the KwaZulu-Natal Income Dynamics study, or KIDS), Maluccio et al. (2000) construct both household-speci…c and community-level individual social capital indices conceptually similar to that employed by Narayan and Pritichett. They …nd that while the community social capital index has no explanatory power for 1993 livelihood outcomes, it does have a large and statistically signi…cant e¤ect in 1998. The individual level variable is signi…cant in both periods, though larger in 1998. They interpret these results as evidence that the post-apartheid period o¤ered new opportunities for upward mobility, opportunities that could be more e¤ectively exploited by individuals with larger endowments of social capital and residing in communities with higher levels of social capital. Following up on the Maluccio et al. study, Haddad and Maluccio (2003) use the 1993 and 1998 rounds of the KIDS data to explore the interactions between group membership and self-reported trust measures.
26 They …nd positive interactions between group membership and self-reported trust, as well as positive impacts of both trust and group membership on the well-being of households. 27 The employ household …xed e¤ects to lessen concerns that the endogeneity of group membership to household well-being biases estimates of the impact of social capital. However, even setting aside these endogeneity concerns, their social capital variables are at best indirect measures of community norms. In addition, these indirect measures are unable to distinguish the e¤ects of trustworthiness from altruism.
Regression Model and Estimation Strategies
The measures derived from the KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) economic experiments permit us to more directly explore the impact of the community social capital of trustworthiness and altruism on the capacity of households to generate a livelihood. The proxy measures of trustworthiness used in many other studies, based on group membership and participation, are arguably not only less precise, they are also economically endogenous in a most immediate way. If membership in groups and clubs is a normal economic good, we would expect higher well-being to lead to increased participation. While even directly measured community norms may be endogenous to economic phenomenon, we can exploit the panel structure of the available KIDS data and write the regression function for the 2004 level of well-being of household i in community g as: 28 and the z ig are the economic and social factors that condition achievable well-being of household i. The unobserved factors, enclosed in square brackets, are partitioned into a community e¤ect ( c g ) and a random error term (" y ig ). Regression equation (4.1) exploits the temporal structure of the available information in several ways. First, the KwaZulu economic experiments were carried out two years in advance of the 2004 round of the KIDS data which we use to construct the measure of household well-being. Short term phenomenon that may have boosted livelihoods in a community thus cannot have also in ‡uenced the pre-determined trustworthiness measure. In addition, the data from the two earlier rounds of the KIDS data (1993 and 1998) to control for levels and trends in household well-being that may be spuriously correlated with observed norms. Finally, we follow Hausman and Taylor (1981) and instrument for the community …xed e¤ect using the community means for all the observed right-hand side variables that vary within communities (including community average initial living standards and prior average growth in living standards). While there is always some chance that some shock randomly perturbed both community norms and 28 For individual i, the measure N g is the mean of all individuals in the community except i.
living standards in the post-1998 period, it is hard to imagine what such a shock might be, 29 especially since the social norms revealed by the KwaZulu economic experiments would be expected to evolve slowly over time. From this perspective, it is important that we rely on direct norm measures rather than associational density measures (as the latter could arguably be easily moved by a short-term income shock). Table 4 .1 presents the results of this estimation strategy. In addition to 1993 per-capita expenditure level and 1993 to 1998 expenditure growth, the other individual control variables in the regression are include the age, education and sex of the household head. Across all of the regressions, initial expenditures and prior expenditure growth are strong and signi…cant predictors of 2004 well-being levels. The included standard human capital variables are not signi…cant, presumably because they change little over time and their in ‡uence has already been subsumed by the variables measuring initial conditions. Mean community initial conditions (which control for community e¤ects) are also signi…cant as would be expected.
Regression Results
The …rst column of Table 4 .1 includes only a single norm measure, the gross share returned by the average trustee in the community.
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As can be seen, the coe¢ cient on this gross trustworthiness measure is economically large and statistically signi…cant. A shift from the 25th percentile value of this community average trustworthiness share (36%) to the value at the 75th percentile (42%) would be estimated to increase the well-being of the median KIDS household by about 42 Rand per-person per-month (or about $US 6). Given that the median household has a per-capita standard of living approximately equal to the national poverty line of 322 Rand/person/month (Hoogeveen and Özler, 2005) , this increase implies a living standards increase of just over 10%.
While this trustworthiness e¤ect implies a rather substantial increase in living standards, as discussed earlier the amount returned by trustor likely re ‡ects the operation of both norms of trustworthiness as well as those of altruism. If Platteau's (2000) intuition is correct, then might expect to see larger returns to trustworthiness once we strip away or control for the e¤ect of altruism. To explore this idea, the second and third columns of 4.1 include measures of both altruism and trustworthiness. Unexpectedly, inclusion of both norm measures makes it impossible to identify a signi…cant e¤ect of trustworthiness on well-being, while altruism shows a robust and signi…cantly positive impact.
At a …rst level, these results suggest that strong, altruistic sharing norms may play a much more important role in promoting economic advance than suspected. Such norms may operate by stabilizing consumption and enabling individuals to undertake riskier, but more remunerative activities.
At a second level, these results encourage a deeper consideration of how social capital might work in order to facilitate economic advance. Conceptual work such as that by Barrett (1997) and Francois and Zabojnik (2005) suggests that it is not trust per se that matters, but rather the boundaries of trust. Our experiments were rooted within single communities. While our experiments should have elicited a durable, action limiting, moral norm of trustworthiness, trustworthiness amongst members of those single communities may not signal the sort of generalized, anonymous trust which these authors suggest is key to development. In addition to these conceptual points, the empirical analysis of social capital would seem to require a more careful structural approach than one that pools data on all households and asks if well-being increases on average with the social capital of trust. While trustworthiness may enhance the capacity of households to informally access capital, insurance or jobs when markets are weak, not all households in a community will be constrained in their access to these goods.
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Pooling all households into a single regression may thus disguise the impact of trust on those who need it. 32 Finally, the capacity of people to assist those whom they trust clearly depends on the resources that they have available to them. A recent theoretical exercise by Mogues and Carter (2005) shows that in a polarized society like South Africa, we might expect endogenously created social capital to o¤er little in the way of upward economic mobility for poor households. Without control for the resources of the trusting group, little could again be inferred from pooled regressions of the sort displayed in Table 4 .1, even when norms are appropriately measured and endogeneity issues handled credibly. Unfortunately, the data available for this study contains scant information on the resources and capacity of local social networks to bridge and connect people to economic opportunity. 33 31 In addition, the variance of trust may be just as important as its average level if social capital works by making agents willing to issue the informal loans that permit economic advance. 32 An alternative approach to the study of social capital is to bypass some of the problems associated with the analysis of reduced form expenditure equations and focus on the impact of norms on a speci…c outcome, such as access to capital, as in Karlan (2002) . 33 In a variation of the regressions reported in Table 7 .1, the trust variable was interacted with measures of average community assets and education levels, with the expectation that these measures might signal the reach and connectedness of local networks. While the estimated coe¢ cients of there terms were positive, they lacked statistical signi…cance.
Discussion and Conclusions
This study set out to assess the claim that the social capital of trustworthiness a¤ects economic outcomes, especially in low-income economies where markets and other formal institutions tend to fail. In an attempt to alleviate the measurement problems associated with this assessment, this study employed variations on trust and dictator games to separately isolate and measure both trustworthiness norms and the strength of altruistic preferences. As opposed to self-reported measures of trust and trustworthiness, economic experiments such as these have the advantage of giving incentives to responders to reveal the behavioral norms that guide their real world decisionmaking. In addition, the experiments were structured in a way designed to reveal internalized or moral norms of behavior that some authors have argued are key to anonymous exchange and e¤ective market institutions.
Combining these experimental norm measures with data on real economic outcomes allows us to re-approach the the type of livelihood regression found in the microeconometric social capital literature. Our directly measured norms, as well as the suite of control variables available from our three round panel study, make our analysis less susceptible to the endogeneity problems that have plagued other social capital studies (Durlauf, 2002) . We …nd that that experimentally measured norms account for variation in economic well-being beyond what can be accounted for by conventional variables. That is, experiments do reveal novel information on the socioeconomic environment, lending further encouragement to studies such as this one that mix results from …eld experiments with real economic data.
Finally, our estimates indicate that altruism has a stronger and more robust e¤ect than does trustworthiness. While this result merits further investigation in its own right, it also suggests that we need to work harder in order to properly understand at the micro level how trust works. Moving forward the social capital research agenda will require not only more careful measurement and modeling of norms (as we have tried to do here). It will also require a more structural approach to the e¤ects of social capital on incomes and livelihoods and greater attention to the capacity of the trusting group to broker opportunities for those who need them .
